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I. INTRODUCTION: MAKING THE CASE FOR AN 
INTERNATIONAL PRISON 
Where do individuals sentenced by an international criminal 
court go to serve their sentence? The answer is: “it depends.” It 
depends on which international tribunal convicted the 
individual, which states have entered a cooperation agreement 
to enforce sentences with the particular tribunal, and which 
state the tribunal believes provides the best fit for that 
particular individual.1 Because there is currently no 
international prison or single location to enforce the criminal 
sentences imposed by international tribunals,2 where a convict 
serves their sentence is of constant uncertainty. 
There have been many advancements in international 
criminal law within the past three decades, including the 
development of ad hoc tribunals to try those accused of war 
crimes or crimes against humanity.3 The ad hoc tribunals have 
                                               
1. See Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia 
Since 1991, Practice Direction on the Procedure for the International Tribunal’s 
Designation of the State in Which a Convicted Person is to Serve His/Her Sentence of 
Imprisonment, ¶¶ 4-5, U.N. Doc. IT/137/Rev. 1 (Sept. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Yugoslavia 
Practice Direction] (giving the President of the Tribunal power to choose the State of a 
convict’s imprisonment after participating countries inform the Tribunal of their 
willingness to take on the convict); Int’l Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda, Practice Direction 
on the Procedure for Designation of the State in Which a Convicted Person Is to Serve 
His/Her Sentence of Imprisonment, ¶¶ 2-4 (Sept. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Rwanda Practice 
Direction] (giving the President of the Tribunal the power to choose the State of a 
convict’s imprisonment after participating countries inform the Tribunal of their 
readiness and willingness to take on the convict); Special Court for Sierra Leone Office of 
the President, Practice Direction for Designation of State for Enforcement of Sentence, 
¶¶ 2-5 (July 10, 2009) [hereinafter Sierra Leone Practice Direction] (giving the President 
of the Tribunal power to choose the State of a convict’s imprisonment after participating 
countries inform the Tribunal of their readiness and willingness to take on the convict). 
2. See Barbora Holá & Joris van Wijk, Life After Conviction at International 
Criminal Tribunals: An Empirical Overview, 12 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 109, 113 (2014) 
(explaining that tribunal prisoners are sent to states selected from a list of states willing 
to enforce the tribunals’ prison sentences). 
3. See S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2 (May 25, 1993) (creating an international tribunal that 
has the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and adopting the Statute of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1 (Nov. 
8, 1994) (adopting the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for the 
purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for violating international humanitarian law 
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diminished immunity for some of the world’s most heinous 
crimes, excluding terrorism and human trafficking.4 Ratification 
of the Rome Statute, which created the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”),5 ensures a permanent approach to combating 
international crimes: individuals accused of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity will either be prosecuted in a court of 
law or ostracized and forced to live in hiding.6 This new era of 
accountability has resulted in the international prosecutions of 
high profile defendants and former heads of state.7 But, there 
                                               
in Rwanda); S.C. Res. 1272, ¶ 1 (Oct. 25, 1999) (establishing a United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor to deal with concerns regarding international 
humanitarian and human rights law violations); S.C. Res. 1315, ¶¶ 1-2 (Aug. 14, 2000) 
(recommending that the Secretary-General negotiate an agreement with the Sierra 
Leone government to create an independent special court to deal with violations of 
international humanitarian law). 
4. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (providing the International Criminal 
Court with jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes 
of aggression). As noted in Article 5 of the Rome Statute, “The Court shall exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with 
articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out conditions under which the Court 
shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.” Id.; see also Bureau of the 
Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau on the Review Conference, ¶¶ 15-22, 
U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/8/43 (noting that the decision was made at the Rome Conference not 
to include terrorism or drug crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court due to concerns that “the inclusion of drug crimes or the crime of terrorism would 
overburden the Court and detract from focusing its limited human and financial 
resources on the most serious crimes agreed to in 1998”). 
5. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 1 (establishing the ICC, governed by the 
provisions of the statute, and granting it the power to exercise jurisdiction over persons 
for the most serious crimes of international concern); see also Mary Margaret Penrose, 
No Badges, No Bars: A Conspicuous Oversight in the Development of an International 
Criminal Court, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 621, 622 (2003) (asserting that the Rome Statute was 
the principal instrument creating the ICC). 
6. See Richard Goldstone, The Role of the United Nations in the Prosecution of 
International War Criminals, 5 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 119, 121-24 (2001) (describing the 
need for a permanent international criminal court because establishing functional ad hoc 
tribunals takes considerable time, leaving war criminals free from prosecution until the 
wheels of justice can finally turn). 
7. See Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges Against Laurent Gbagbo, ¶¶ 267-78 (June 12, 2014) (noting the 
charges brought against former Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagdo and the 
underlying facts giving rise to the charges); Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. 
IT-02-54-T, Amended Indictment ‘‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’’ (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 22, 2002) 
2-Penrose FINAL (Do Not Delete) 5/18/2016 9:53 PM 
428 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 38:2 
remain critical enforcement shortcomings in the current 
system.8 The ICC is literally just a court, a building with judges, 
lawyers, and staff, with no enforcement mechanisms to secure 
arrests or effectuate sentences. A mere eight states have entered 
sentencing enforcement agreements with the ICC, none within 
the past three years.9 This deficiency, while not currently posing 
an impediment to justice, will likely become a problem once the 
ICC moves beyond a handful of convictions.10 
The Assembly of States Parties to the ICC specifically 
addressed the lack of cooperating states for sentence 
enforcement purposes at its Thirteenth Session in December 
2014.11 The Bureau of Assembly of States issued a Report of the 
Bureau on Cooperation which highlighted the lack of 
enforcement agreements and the lack of recent commitment by 
States Parties to accept convicted individuals for enforcement 
purposes.12 The Report noted that the ICC has “stressed” that ad 
                                               
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/mil-ai040421-e.htm (indicting the 
former Serbian President for, inter alia, crimes against humanity and genocide). 
8. See, e.g., Owen Bowcott, ICC Drops Murder and Rape Charges Against Kenyan 
President, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2014, 9:10 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ 
dec/05/crimes-humanity-charges-kenya-president-dropped-uhuru-kenyatta (reporting 
that the charges against current Kenyan head of state, Kenyatta, were withdrawn 
because the Prosecutor could not secure sufficient evidence against Kenyatta due to 
obstruction and lack of cooperation from the Kenyan government). 
9. Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties, Rep. of the Bureau on Cooperation, 
¶ 22, ICC-ASP/13/29 (Nov. 21, 2014). 
10.  See id. (noting the Court is concerned about having only eight States Parties 
participating in enforcement agreements because a range of geographical locations is 
needed in order to meet the cultural and linguistic needs of sentenced persons); see also 
INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, QUESTION & ANSWER: THE ICC APPEALS CHAMBER CONFIRMS 
THE VERDICT AND THE SENTENCE AGAINST THOMAS LUBANGA DYILO 2 (2014), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/Lubanga-Q-a-A-Eng-01-12-2014.pdf 
(reporting that Lubanga Dyilo had served almost two-thirds of his fourteen year 
sentence in the Hague because there was still no determination as to where he would 
serve his sentence); David Davenport, International Criminal Court: 12 Years, $1 
Billion, 2 Convictions, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2014, 2:57 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport/2014/03/12/ international-criminal-court-12-
years-1-billion-2-convictions-2/ (reporting that the ICC has only convicted two 
individuals in its twelve year history). 
11. Rep. of the Bureau on Cooperation, supra note 9, ¶ 20. 
12. See id. ¶ 22 (highlighting that the ICC has only signed eight sentence 
enforcement agreements and no further agreements have been reached since the most 
recent agreement was reached three years prior). 
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hoc enforcement agreements, though permissible, “were not 
ideal.”13 
Now that a permanent institution exists ready to prosecute 
those who are most deserving of international condemnation and 
punishment, it is strange that no corresponding permanent 
facility exists to house those convicted by the ICC.14 
Remarkably, little attention has been given to the important 
realities of a permanent criminal court – prisoners facing 
lengthy prison terms.15 One cannot begin to comprehensively 
address international crime without addressing the full 
spectrum of prosecution, from arrest and pre-trial detention to 
incarceration, particularly when the primary penalty before 
international criminal tribunals remains imprisonment.16 
We have an international criminal court, but no coexisting 
international prison.17 The maintenance of a permanent ICC 
requires us to assess the viability of a criminal justice system 
that fails to possess a centrally located, permanent prison 
                                               
13. Id. ¶ 19. 
14. See Penrose, supra note 5, at 621-22, 626, 642 (commenting that we must fix 
the shortcomings of the ICC, particularly the lack of a permanent facility to house ICC 
convicts); ICC Holds Groundbreaking Ceremony for Permanent Premises Construction, 
INT’L CRIMINAL COURT (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about% 
20the%20court/permanent%20premises/latestnewsandcalendar/Pages/-ICC-holds-
groundbreaking-ceremony-for-Permanent-Premises-construction.aspx (lauding the 
construction of the ICC’s permanent premises as a facility that should convey a strong 
image of an institution established to impart justice and combat impunity). 
15. See RÓISÍN MULGREW, TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
PENAL SYSTEM 56 (2013) (noting that international criminal tribunals have the authority 
to impose sentences and have final say on decisions relating to release, yet rely entirely 
on volunteer states to carry such sentences out); Penrose, supra note 5, at 626 
(evaluating major deficiencies in the ICC, including the lack of a permanent facility to 
house ICC convicts); Mary Margaret Penrose, Spandau Revisited: The Question of 
Detention for International War Crimes, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 553, 564, 580 (2000) 
(commenting on the problem of tribunals issuing sentences up to life in prison, which 
will outlast the temporary tribunals); Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 111-12 
(comparing the length and severity of sentences at the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL). 
16. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 77 (listing the applicable penalties, 
including imprisonment for a specified number of years – not to exceed thirty years – 
and life imprisonment “when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the 
individual circumstances of the convicted person”); Penrose, supra note 5, at 642 
(claiming that a world criminal court needs traditional components of a criminal justice 
system, such as police power and incarceration facilities, in order to be successful). 
17. See Penrose, supra note 5, at 626. 
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capable of housing convicted war criminals and those who 
committed crimes against humanity.18 
Currently, all international tribunals rely on cooperating 
states to voluntarily agree to accept a particular convict.19 The 
list of willing states has been short and regionalized. The ICC, 
much like the enforcement system utilized by the ad hoc 
tribunals, continues to rely on cooperating states to help arrest 
those indicted and, eventually, house the convicted.20 The lack of 
enforcement mechanisms have plagued the various tribunals, as 
numerous individuals have avoided trial simply by evading 
arrest while others have served the majority of their sentence in 
a holding cell in the Netherlands.21 Because these states’ 
cooperation is entirely voluntary, they can reject any individual 
presented.22 Thus, the ICC has no assurance that its convicts 
                                               
18. See id. at 635-42 (asserting that the international community must address the 
need for the ICC to have a permanent prison facility if the Court is to be a success). 
19. See, e.g., Yugoslavia Practice Direction, supra note 1, ¶¶ 2 & 4 (directing the 
Registrar of the International Tribunal to report to the Tribunal’s President the Member 
State’s willingness to accept a convicted person). The U.N. Security Council established 
the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals to conclude the remaining 
tasks, including the enforcement of sentences facing the now dormant ICTY and ICTR. 
S.C. Res. 1966, arts. 2 & 25(2) (Dec. 22, 2010). The MICT began functions relating to the 
ICTR on July 1, 2012 and the ICTY on July 1, 2013. Id. pmbl. ¶ 1. Article 25 addresses 
the “Enforcement of Sentences,” and Article 26 addresses “Pardon or Commutation of 
Sentences.” Id. arts. 25 & 26. Article 25 of the MICT provides that “[i]mprisonment shall 
be served in a State designated by the Mechanism from a list of states with which the 
United Nations has agreements for this purpose. Such imprisonment shall be in 
accordance with the applicable law of the State concerned, subject to the supervision of 
the Mechanism.” Id. art. 25. 
20. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 103(1)(a) (“A sentence of imprisonment 
shall be served in a State designated by the Court from a list of States which have 
indicated to the Court their willingness to accepted sentenced persons.”). 
21. See Klaus Hoffmann, Some Remarks on the Enforcement of International 
Sentences in Light of the Galić Case at the ICTY, 10 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE 
STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK 838, 842 (2011) (Ger.) (“Already today, many perpetrators spent 
a number of years during pre-trial and trial stages in the UN prison in 
Scheveningen/The Hague. In case of very short prison sentences, some convicted 
prisoners have never been transferred to another state of enforcement.”). 
22. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 103(1)(b)-(c) (stating that a State shall 
inform the Court whether it will accept a convict, and providing that a State may attach 
conditions to its willingness to accept sentenced persons). Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, 
at 115 noted that there is a “double-consent” process for designating a state for sentence 
enforcement, by which “first, a state must enter into an enforcement agreement with a 
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will have an available state to enforce its penalties once an 
individual is convicted and sentenced.23 
It seems unlikely that a twenty-first century international 
criminal justice system can successfully exist on a 
one-dimensional level – the maintenance of a court without 
corresponding police and prison enforcement mechanisms.24 The 
current model is woefully incomplete, embracing the paradigm 
of the past, not the modern world.25 We have abandoned the ad 
hoc tribunal approach, recognizing its shortcomings. We have 
embraced the need for a permanent international criminal 
justice system.26 Why then, do we continue to use an ad hoc, 
cooperating states model to mete out penalties imposed by a 
permanent criminal court?27 Historical deficiencies suggest the 
time is ripe to consider whether an international prison system 
is a necessary component of the nascent ICC system.28 
This Article asserts that a permanent international prison is 
a necessary, if not indispensable, component of any effective 
international criminal justice system. It begins by first 
                                               
tribunal and express its willingness to enforce sentences in [the] future and second, 
these states agree to accept the individual convicts on an ad hoc basis.” 
23. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 103(4) (“If no State is designated . . . the 
sentence of imprisonment shall be served in a prison facility made available by the host 
State.”). 
24. See Penrose, supra note 5, at 625-26 (arguing that because the ICC lacks a 
coercive enforcement mechanism and permanent prison system, the Court is destined for 
limited success). 
25. See id. at 642 (arguing that by maintaining the inadequate enforcement and 
imprisonment mechanisms that plagued the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC is not sufficiently 
capable of enforcing international criminal law). 
26. See generally Duane W. Krohnke, International Criminal Justice: Winding 
down Two Ad-Hoc Criminal Tribunals, DWKCOMMENTARIES (June 18, 2011), http:// 
dwkcommentaries.com/2011/06/18/international-criminal-justice-winding-down-two-ad-
hoc-criminal-tribunals/ (discussing the phasing out of the ICTY and ICTR and how the 
ICC solves some of those tribunals’ shortcomings). 
27. See, e.g., Penrose, supra note 5, at 642 (arguing that the ICC should implement 
the “traditional components of a criminal justice system” to avoid dependence on the 
political influences of the participating states). 
28. See Róisín Mulgrew, On the Enforcement of Sentences Imposed by International 
Courts: Challenges Faced by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
373, 395-96 (2009) (noting that a lack of support from participating states has made 
SCSL enforcement difficult and that the creation of an international prison system needs 
to be considered). 
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addressing the historical approach to international sentencing. 
Next, it discusses the inadequacies of the status quo. Finally, it 
argues the time has come to construct a permanent 
international prison, rather than adhere to the ad hoc approach 
in dealing with international criminals and convicts. 
II. THE HISTORICAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL 
SENTENCING: FROM NUREMBERG TO THE COOPERATING 
STATES MODEL 
Following the United Nations’ creation of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY)29 and, shortly 
thereafter, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR),30 the international community convicted its first 
international war criminals since the Nuremberg Trials and the 
Tokyo Tribunal following World War II.31 But, unlike the World 
War II courts that relied upon the Allied occupation to carry out 
the penalties, including imprisonment and executions, the 
modern international system has no single entity tasked with 
overseeing the enforcement of prison sentences.32 While the 
victorious Allies were able to utilize existing prison facilities in 
Germany and Japan, the ICTY and ICTR had no such luxury.33 
Instead, the ICTY and ICTR were forced to rely on cooperating 
states to aid in the enforcement of these court’s criminal 
sentences, all of which are strictly limited to terms of 
imprisonment.34 
                                               
29. See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 3, ¶ 2 (creating the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia). 
30. See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 3, ¶ 1 (creating the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda). 
31. See generally About the ICTY, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, 
http://www.icty.org/en/about (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (showing that the ICTY and 
ICTR were the first criminal tribunals to be established since the criminal tribunals in 
Nuremberg and Japan). 
32. See Penrose, supra note 15, at 565-66 (detailing that the sentences handed 
down during the Nuremberg Trials were overseen by the Allies, while the enforcement of 
ICTY and ICTR sentences are governed by both the tribunal and the host state). 
33. See id. 
34. See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 3, art. 27 (stating that imprisonment shall be 
served in a cooperating state, and that “imprisonment shall be in accordance with the 
applicable law of the State concerned, subject to the supervision of the International 
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Likewise, while the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) 
contains a statutory preference for enforcing sentences within 
Sierra Leone,35 the realities of the situation in a poverty-
stricken, post-conflict nation state has precluded this from 
occurring.36 So, the SCSL, much like the ICTY and ICTR, 
“cannot directly implement its own sanctions” due solely to the 
lack of a functioning prison facility.37 As a result, all SCSL 
convicts have been placed outside Sierra Leone to serve out their 
respective sentences.38 
In contrast to the modern ad hoc tribunals, the early 
international tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo provided 
centralized prison space to enforce the international criminal 
sentences imposed.39 Following the World War II tribunals, that 
space remained in the conquered territories of Germany and 
Japan.40 Modernly, however, the ICC, much like the ICTY and 
                                               
Tribunal”); S.C. Res. 955, supra note 3, art. 26 (limiting place of imprisonment to “any of 
the States on a list of States which have indicated to the Security Council their 
willingness to accept convicted persons”). 
35. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone 
on the Establishment of a Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone, Statute of the 
Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 23(1) (2010), 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/ RSCSL%20Agreement%20and%20Statute.pdf 
[hereinafter RSCSL Statute]; Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 374. 
36. Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 374. 
37. Id. 
38. See id. (stating that SCSL has to rely on third-party states to accept custody of 
SCSL prisoners); Rwanda Signs Prisoner Deal with Sierra Leone Court, ICC OBSERVERS 
(Mar. 21, 2009), http://iccobservers.wordpress.com/tag/special-court-for-sierra-leone/ 
(noting that SCSL convicts are being sent to Mpanga Prison in Rwanda); Distance from 
Uganda to Sierra Leone, DISTANCEFROMTO (last visited Oct. 28, 2015), 
http://distancefromto.net/distance-from/Uganda/to/Sierra+Leone (showing that Uganda, 
where Mpanga prison is located, is 3,070 miles from Sierra Leone); Liberian Charles 
Taylor Moved to British Prison to Serve War Crimes Conviction, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 15, 
2013, 2:43 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/
liberia/ 10380401/Liberian-Charles-Taylor-moved-to-British-prison-to-serve-war-crimes-
conviction.html (detailing that the lone exception to sending its prisoners to Mpanga is 
Charles Taylor, who was sent to the United Kingdom to serve his sentence).  
39. See Penrose, supra note 15, at 564-65 (stating that unlike the current 
tribunals, convicts from the Nuremberg and Tokyo served their entire sentences at their 
respective facilities). 
40. See SPANDAU, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/place/Spandau# 
ref980279 (last visited Oct. 17, 2015) (detailing that the Spandau prison located near 
Berlin housed the Nazi War Criminals until the last one died in 1987); The Tribunal – 
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ICTR before it, does not possess an occupied territory and must 
defer to the willingness of other cooperating states to effectuate 
its sentences.41 This decentralized approach to imprisonment 
has implications beyond mere location of prison space. The 
absence of a cohesive international prison system raises 
complications relating to family access, language difficulties, 
and rehabilitation, thereby potentially undermining the 
ultimate efficacy of international justice. 
While the ICTY and ICTR initially prohibited imprisonment 
in either Yugoslavia or Rwanda, a domestic solution was 
successfully used during World War II due to the occupying 
nations controlling the prison facilities. This local approach has 
been incorporated into one modern international tribunal.42 The 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”), a 
United Nations-backed domestic court tasked with investigating 
and prosecuting crimes relating to the Khmer Rouge regime of 
the 1970s, has adopted a domestic sentencing approach for its 
convicts.43 Much like the World War II tribunals, the ECCC will 
                                               
An Overview, TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL – A DIGITAL EXHIBITION, 
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/ imtfe/tribunal (last visited Oct. 28, 2015) (stating that all the 
war criminals in the Military Tribunal were sent to and died in Sugamo Prison in 
Tokyo). 
41. See supra notes 20 & 34 and accompanying text. 
42. See Kaing Guek Eav Transferred to Kandal Prison, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS 
IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA (June 18, 2013, 2:33 PM), 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/ kaing-guek-eav-transferred-kandal-prision (detailing 
that the ECCC is a domestic legal system in which Cambodian authorities are 
responsible for the imprisonment of those individuals convicted by the ECCC); Penrose, 
supra note 15 (showing that the Nuremberg Tribunal had the Allies oversee the 
enforcement of their sentences while the Tokyo Tribunal had the U.S. Army oversee the 
enforcement of their sentences).  
43. See About ECCC, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2015), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/about-eccc. The ECCC was created 
by Cambodian law to address crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge regime 
between the years 1975-1979. Id. “The government of Cambodia insisted that, for the 
sake of the Cambodian people, the trial must be held in Cambodia using Cambodian 
staff and judges together with foreign personnel.” Id. Still, the ECCC utilizes a 
cooperative approach between national law and the United Nations. Id. See generally 
Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia 
Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the 
Period of Democratic Kampuchea, U.N.-Cambodia, June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117. 
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place its inmates directly in domestic prisons,44 which will 
provide far easier transitions relating to language, religion, 
access to counsel and visitation issues. To date, only one person, 
Kaing Guek Eav, has been found guilty, sentenced by the ECCC, 
and transferred to Kandal Provincial Prison in Cambodia.45 
Thus, there is little evidence of how the domestic model 
performs in modern society.46 But, if past experiences with 
Spandau prison in Berlin, Germany47 and Sugamo prison in 
Tokyo48 are any indication, the domestic model at least offers the 
                                               
44. See Kaing Guek Eav Transferred to Kandal Prison, supra note 42 (detailing 
that the ECCC is a domestic legal system in which Cambodian authorities are 
responsible for the imprisonment of those individuals convicted by the ECCC). 
45. Id.; see also Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case No. 001, Appeal 
Judgment, pt. VIII, at 320 (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia July 26, 
2010), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/Case% 20001Appeal 
JudgementEn.pdf (upholding convictions for crimes against humanity and war crimes 
but overturning the sentence of thirty-five years and replacing it with life 
imprisonment). Two others, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, have been found guilty and 
received life sentences; they are currently in a detention center waiting for their appeals 
to be heard. Prosecutor v. Nuon Chea & Khieu Samphan, Case No. 002/01, Judgement, 
¶ 20 (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Aug. 7, 2014), 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/2014-08-07%2017:04/E313_ 
Trial%20Chamber%20Judgement%20Case%20002_ 01_ENG.pdf; Chris Blake & Kevin 
Doyle, Khmer Rouge Leaders Sentenced to Life in Jail for War Crimes, BLOOMBERG 
(Aug. 7, 2014, 1:18 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-07/khmer-
rouge-leaders-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-for-war-crimes. 
46. See International Criminal Tribunals and Special Courts, GLOB. POLICY 
FORUM (last visited Oct. 28, 2015), http://globalpolicy.org/international-
justice/international-criminal-tribunals-and-special-courts.html (listing the Special 
Courts in Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Cambodia, and East Timor as the only international 
criminal tribunals to develop after those in Rwanda and Yugoslavia); see also Nuon Chea 
and Khieu Samphan Sentenced to Life Imprisonment for Crimes Against Humanity, 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (Aug. 7, 2014), 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/nuon-chea-and-khieu-samphan-sentenced-life-
imprisonment-crimes-against-humanity (detailing that two additional defendants, Nuon 
Chea and Khieu Samphan have both been convicted of crimes against humanity and 
have been sentenced by the ECCC Trial Chamber to life in prison); Lauren Crothers, 
Khmer Rouge Leaders Appeal Life Sentences for Crimes Against Humanity, GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 30, 2014, 4:40 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2014/sep/30/khmer-rouge-
leaders-appeal-life-sentences-crimes-humanity (stating that Chea and Samphan filed a 
notice of appeal). 
47. SPANDAU, supra note 40. 
48. BILL BARRETTE, ART AND EXCHANGE AT SUGAMO PRISON, 1945-52, JAPAN POL’Y 
RES. INST. OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 33 (Oct. 2004), http://www.jpri.org/publications/ 
occasionalpapers/op33.html. 
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benefits of a common language, a common culture, and better 
access to family. 
Perhaps recognizing the inherent limitations of a pure 
cooperating states model, the ICC has adopted a hybrid 
approach that relies primarily on willing states to house its 
convicts but also provides that in a given case, where no such 
nation state provides its acquiescence, the ICC Host State, the 
Netherlands, will accommodate the convict in a domestic 
prison.49 The ICC’s statutory design accepts there may be 
instances where it is impossible to secure a cooperating state 
placement. The creation of this safety net implicitly 
acknowledges that the cooperating state model offers an 
incomplete solution, at best, and provides further evidence that 
a new, more permanent system should be achieved. The lack of 
state cooperation was further addressed at the ICC when the 
Review Conference recently added the option that 
“imprisonment may be served in a prison facility made available 
in the designated State through an international or regional 
organization, mechanism or agency.”50 
What remains surprising, in light of the lack of state 
cooperation spanning from the ad hoc tribunals to the ICC, is 
that the international community has not pressed the need for 
an alternative to the status quo. It has made no discernable 
movement toward a permanent international prison. The 
primary shortcoming of the cooperating states model is that only 
a small number of nation states participate, which results in a 
sparse, regionalized approach to incarceration.51 Few nation 
                                               
49. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 103(4) (stating that “if no State is 
designated [for enforcement of the sentence], the sentence of imprisonment shall be 
served in a prison facility made available by the host State”); id. art. 3(1) (establishing 
the Netherlands as “the host State”). 
50. Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
ICC Res. RC/Res.3, ¶ 2 (June 8, 2010) (noting the ICC’s mindfulness “of the need for 
broader participation of States in the enforcement of sentences in order to allow for such 
enforcement in all relevant regions and sub regions”). 
51. See Rep. of the Bureau on Cooperation, supra note 9, ¶ 22 (stating that the 
Bureau only has eight States that have signed sentence enforcement agreements); 
Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 395 (observing that “with many of the difficulties relating to 
enforcement being attributable to the lack of support from states, it is perhaps time for 
international courts to take direct control over the implementation of their sanctions”). 
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states have expressed willingness to receive international 
convicts from these international tribunals, with most accepting 
countries being regionally concentrated in Europe and Africa.52 
The continents of Asia, Australia, and the Americas (with the 
exception of Colombia) have, thus far, failed to contribute prison 
space or facilities to enforce internationally imposed sentences.53 
Russia, too, has withheld its cooperation from the international 
tribunals, though several Eastern European countries have 
entered enforcement agreements.54 Simply put, the majority of 
the world’s governments and population have decided not to 
cooperate.55 
Thus, part of the ICC’s efficacy, assuming that prosecutions 
and sentences become more common, will depend on whether 
there are sufficient nation states willing to house, service, and 
rehabilitate convicted individuals.56 Currently, there have only 
                                               
52. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 113 (noting that fifty-seven persons 
convicted by the ICTY, ICTR, or SCSL are serving their sentences “in various European 
and African countries”). 
53. Cf. Bilateral Agreements, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR RWANDA, http://unictr.unmict. 
org/en/documents/bilateral-agreements (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (showing that only 
eight countries entered bilateral agreements with the ICTR to enforce sentences: Mali 
(1999), Benin (1999), Swaziland (2000), France (2004), Italy (2004), Sweden (2004), 
Rwanda (2008), and Senegal (2010)); Member States Cooperation, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/documents/member-states-cooperation (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2016) (listing the sixteen countries that have entered into bilateral 
agreements to enforce ICTY sentences). 
54. See Member States Cooperation, supra note 53. Sixteen countries, including 
Eastern European countries, have entered bilateral agreements with the ICTY to enforce 
sentences, but Russia has not. Id. The countries that have entered bilateral agreements 
with the ICTY include: Italy (1997), Finland (1997), Norway (1998), Austria (1999), 
Sweden (1999), France (2000), Spain (2000), Denmark (2002), United Kingdom (2004), 
Belgium (2007), Ukraine (2007), Portugal (2007), Estonia (2008), Slovakia (2008), Poland 
(2008), and Albania (2008). Id. 
55. See supra notes 20-22 & 53 and accompanying text. 
56. See Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 378 (explaining that states must be willing to 
house international convicts). A criticism – not without force – is that the work of the 
ICC has been slow and costly. See Davenport, supra note 10 (explaining the ICC’s low 
conviction rate and high operation cost). The ICC has been in existence for twelve years, 
has received approximately $1 billion in operating costs, and has two convictions to date. 
Id. This pace does not fortify the call for any prison, much less an international prison. 
See id. (stating the ICC is too expensive to justify). Rather, as David Davenport argues, 
this funding “would be better utilized to strengthen national and regional criminal 
justice” systems. Id. 
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been two final convictions before the ICC.57 Both sentences are 
being enforced by their domestic country, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, through ad hoc agreements rather than 
in any “cooperating state” with a prior ICC sentencing 
agreement.58 
The ICC constricts a cooperating state’s power to reduce 
sentences until “the person has served two thirds of the 
sentence, or twenty five years in the case of life imprisonment.”59 
Similarly, the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals 
(“MICT”) now uses a “rule of thumb” that convicts are eligible 
for early release once they have served two-thirds of their 
sentence.60 But, even with the “two-thirds” approach, the 
governing laws of a particular cooperating state may be at odds 
with ICC and MICT practices. A far more predictable and 
certain approach would be to create a truly international prison 
system, so that decisions relating to release and rehabilitation 
are standardized for all international convicts through policies 
                                               
57. Davenport, supra note 10. The conviction of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo became 
final when the Appeals Chamber confirmed the verdict and fourteen-year sentence on 
December 1, 2014. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on 
the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Against his Conviction, ¶ 529 (Dec. 1, 2014). 
The other conviction involves Congolese militia leader Germain Katanga, who was 
sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment by Trial Chamber II on May 23, 2014. 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to 
Article 76 of the Statute, ¶ 170 (May 23, 2014). 
58. Both men have been transferred to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to 
serve their twelve- and fourteen-year sentences. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, 
ICC-01/04-01/07, Ad Hoc Agreement Between the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and the International Criminal Court on Enforcement of the 
Sentence of the International Criminal Court Imposed on Mr. Germain Katanga (Nov. 
24, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2179227.pdf; Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Ad Hoc Agreement Between the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the International Criminal Court on Enforcement 
of the Sentence of the International Criminal Court Imposed on Mr. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2179222.pdf; see also Press 
Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Germain Katanga Transferred to 
the DRC to Serve their Sentences of Imprisonment, ICC Press Release PR1181 (Dec. 19, 
2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/
Pages/pr1181.aspx. 
59. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 110. 
60. See Jonathan H. Choi, Early Release in International Criminal Law, 123 YALE 
L.J. 1784, 1788 (2013) (noting convicts presumptively only need to serve two-thirds of 
their sentence to be eligible for early release). 
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created and enforced by an international prison.61 While the ICC 
and MICT remain the final word on release issues, having a 
single international entity (particularly one with international 
prisoner expertise) provide recommendations on release would 
be an improvement over the status quo.62 
In over a decade of existence, with only two final convictions, 
the ICC has little current need for actual prison space. But, the 
permanence of the ICC, coupled with its ongoing investigations 
and prosecutions, suggests that more convictions will occur in 
the future.63 Because war crimes and crimes against humanity 
tend to be carried out by large groups of people, a given conflict 
can produce several defendants. If this remains true, a present 
or future conflict could produce an abrupt uptake in convictions. 
If the ICC hits a critical mass of sentenced individuals, will 
there be a sufficient number of countries willing to accept and 
bear the cost of housing ICC convicts? The resolution of this 
question, coupled with the shortcomings in the status quo, 
strengthen the case for the creation of a truly international 
prison. 
III. SHORTCOMINGS IN THE STATUS QUO 
A. The Lack of Cooperating States 
The ICTY,64 ICTR,65 and SCSL66 have ceased their official 
business, turning over all future activity to the MICT67 or, in the 
                                               
61. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 4, arts. 59(4), 60(2), 81(3)(b)-(c) (outlining 
the discretionary powers the ICC grants to courts to decide certain questions of release of 
prisoners in limited circumstances). 
62. See id.  
63. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (listing the ICC’s various ongoing 
cases). Currently, the ICC reports it has twenty three ongoing cases. Id. In addition, the 
ICC is investigating nine distinct situations that could yield numerous defendants. Id. 
From Uganda to the recent investigation opened involving Israel’s treatment of the 
Palestinians, there is an understanding that the ICC’s judicial footprint will grow in the 
coming years. Id. 
64. See S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 19, ¶ 1 (establishing that the International 
Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals would begin functioning for the ICTY on July 1, 
2013). 
65. See id. (indicating the MICT began functioning for the ICTR on July 1, 2012). 
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case of the SCSL, the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(“RSCSL”).68 All outstanding business, including potential 
future trials which would have fallen within the jurisdiction of 
the ad hoc tribunals, has been transferred to the MICT69 and 
RSCSL.70 The most important remaining business continues to 
be oversight of the criminal sentences imposed by each of these 
ad hoc tribunals, including questions of early release.71 
Accordingly, the United Nations Security Council granted power 
to the MICT and RSCSL to oversee the remaining functions of 
the ad hoc tribunals after their respective mandates expired.72 
This obligation includes designating potential enforcement 
states and determining questions of pardon and early release.73 
The MICT and RSCSL, just as the ICTY and ICTR before them, 
maintain Practice Directions to help guide these early release 
decisions.74 In contrast to the ad hoc tribunals, the RSCSL has 
                                               
66. The SCSL closed in 2013 and was replaced by the Residual Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (RSCSL). Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of 
Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1 
(2010) [hereinafter Agreement to Establish RSCSL]; The Mandate of the Residual 
Special Court for Sierra Leone: Background, SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, 
RESIDUAL SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.rscsl.org/RSCSL-
Mandate.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
67. Security Council Establishes Residual Mechanism to Conclude Tasks of 
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda, Former Yugoslavia, UNITED NATIONS 
(Dec. 22, 2010), http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc10141.doc.htm [hereinafter Security 
Council Establishes Residual Mechanism]. 
68. The Mandate of the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone: Background, 
supra note 66. 
69. See About the MICT, U.N. MECHANISM FOR INT’L CRIM. TRIBS., http://www. 
unmict.org/en/about (last visited Oct. 9, 2015) (“Securing the arrest, transfer and 
prosecution of the nine remaining fugitives still wanted for trial by the ICTR is a top 
priority for the Mechanism.”). 
70. The Mandate of the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone: Background, 
supra note 66. 
71. See id. (stating that the authority of RSCSL to manage requests for review of 
convictions and acquittals may extend until 2055). 
72. Security Council Establishes Residual Mechanism, supra note 67. The MICT 
was initially put into place for a period of four years with a review scheduled every two 
years thereafter. Id. 
73. S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 19, arts. 25-26; RSCSL Statute, supra note 35, 
arts. 23-24. 
74. See generally Mechanism for Int’l Crim. Tribs., Practice Direction on the 
Procedure for Designation of the State in Which a Convicted Person Is to Serve His or Her 
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noted in its Practice Direction that inmates are not eligible for 
early release prior to serving two-thirds of their sentence.75 And, 
while the MICT Practice Direction suggests that domestic law in 
the enforcing state triggers eligibility for early release,76 one 
source notes the MICT has adopted the two thirds rule as an 
informal governing principle.77 
As of November 19, 2014, the MICT was overseeing the 
enforcement of 18 sentences on behalf of the ICTY, with inmates 
spread over twelve countries, and twenty nine sentences on 
behalf of the ICTR split between only two African countries.78 
The MICT reported that sixteen ICTR convicts were serving 
their sentences in Mali, and thirteen more were in Benin.79 In 
contrast, the eighteen ICTY convicts were all serving their 
sentences in European states including “Austria (1), Belgium 
                                               
Sentence of Imprisonment, ¶ 1, MICT/2 Rev. 1 (Apr. 24, 2014) [hereinafter MICT Practice 
Direction, Designation of State] (establishing an internal procedure for MICT’s 
“designation of the State in which a convicted person is to serve his or her sentence of 
imprisonment”); Mechanism for Int’l Crim. Tribs., Practice Direction on the Procedure for 
the Determination of Applications for Pardon, Commutation of Sentence, and Early 
Release of Persons Convicted by the ICTR, the ICTY or the Mechanism, ¶ 1, MICT/3 (July 
5, 2012) [hereinafter MICT Practice Direction, Early Release] (establishing an internal 
procedure for MICT’s “determination of applications for pardon, commutation of 
sentence, and early release of persons convicted by the respective Tribunal or by the 
Mechanism”); Special Court for Sierra Leone, Practice Direction on the Conditional Early 
Release of Persons Convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, ¶ 2 (Jan. 10, 2013) 
[hereinafter SCSL Practice Direction, Early Release] (providing criteria in determining a 
convicted person’s eligibility for conditional early release). 
75. SCSL Practice Direction, Early Release, supra note 74, ¶ 2(A). 
76. The Practice Direction section on “Notification of Eligibility” indicates that 
“[u]pon the convicted person becoming eligible for pardon, commutation of sentence or 
early release under the law of the State in which the convicted person is serving his or her 
sentence (the “enforcing State”), the enforcing State shall . . . notify the Mechanism 
accordingly.” MICT Practice Direction, Early Release, supra note 74, ¶ 2 (emphasis 
added). See also S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 19, art. 26 (“If, pursuant to the applicable law 
of the State in which the person convicted by the ICTY, the ICTR, or the Mechanism is 
imprisoned, he or she is eligible for pardon or commutation of sentence, the State 
concerned shall notify the Mechanism accordingly.” (emphasis added)). 
77. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
78. Assessment and Progress Rep. of the President of the Int’l Residual Mechanism 
for Crim. Tribs. (2014), Judge Theodor Meron, for the Period From 16 May to 19 
November 2014, transmitted by Letter Dated 19 November 2014 from the President of 
the Int’l Residual Mechanism for Crim. Tribs. Addressed to the President of the Sec. 
Council, ¶¶ 43-44, U.N. Doc. S/2014/826 (Nov. 19, 2014). 
79. Id. ¶ 43. 
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(1), Denmark (2), Estonia (3), Finland (1), France (1), Germany 
(3), Italy (1), Norway (1), Poland (1), Portugal (1) and Sweden 
(2).”80 Six ICTR convicts and two ICTY convicts are still being 
housed at the detention units in Arusha and the Hague, 
respectively.81 All existing bilateral agreements entered into by 
the ad hoc tribunals continue in force for the MICT.82 
The MICT, like each international tribunal preceding it, 
continues – somewhat in vain – to call on the cooperation of 
states to help secure additional agreements for the enforcement 
of sentences.83 No new state that had not previously provided 
prison space for the enforcement of sentences to either the ICTY 
or ICTR has entered into a bilateral agreement with the MICT.84 
This inertia underscores the need for change, permanent 
change. 
The lack of participating states under the cooperating states 
model continues to be a problem.85 Every ad hoc court, the 
MICT, and now the ICC continue to call on states to aid in the 
enforcement of sentences, generally to little avail.86 If states 
refuse to step up and accept these international prisoners, the 
system of international criminal justice will face a serious threat 
to its future endeavors. In the Bureau of the Assembly of States 
Parties Report of the Bureau on Cooperation, the Bureau 
exposed the second main shortcoming to the existing model: a 
lack of sufficient diversity to accommodate the sentencing 
enforcement needs. The Report asserts: 
                                               
80. Id. ¶ 44. 
81. Id. ¶¶ 43-44. 
82. See id. ¶ 41 (“The agreements concluded by the United Nations for the two 
Tribunals remain in force for the Mechanism.”). 
83. See id. (“The Mechanism relies on the cooperation of States for the enforcement 
of sentences.”). 
84. See Member State Agreements, U.N. MECHANISM INT’L CRIM. TRIBS., 
http://www. unmict.org/en/basic-documents (last visited Mar. 31, 2016) (demonstrating 
that only the pre-existing enforcement agreements with the ICTY and ICTR remain in 
effect – no new member state agreements are reported). 
85. Rep. of the Bureau on Cooperation, supra note 9, ¶ 22. 
86. Id.; Int’l Residual Mechanism for Crim. Tribs., Second Annual Rep., ¶ 66, U.N. 
Doc. A/69/226-S/2014/555 (Aug. 1, 2014) (“The Mechanism actively sought the 
cooperation of existing enforcement States in enforcing the sentences of the two 
Tribunals and continued efforts to negotiate additional agreements with States in order 
to increase its enforcement capacity.”). 
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The Court would wish to have a broad range of 
agreements in different geographical areas and 
different normative regimes, so as to be ready to 
determine enforcements. This would allow the Court to 
meet the cultural and linguistic needs for sentenced 
persons, including for the families of the individuals 
concerned.87 
The continuing business of the ad hoc tribunals consumes 
scarce incarceration resources.88 Amnesty International 
specifically noted, prior to the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of 
States Parties to the Rome Statute in December 2014, that the 
need to secure cooperating states for the enforcement of 
sentences remains acute.89 In fact, Amnesty echoed the concern 
first reported by the Bureau that only eight states have thus far 
entered enforcement agreements, with no new state entering 
into such an agreement in the past three years.90 This dearth of 
cooperation has existed for each of the modern international 
tribunals, from the ad hoc tribunals to the ICC. Simply put, the 
cooperating states model has proven a constant struggle. 
B. Conditions, Distance, Language, Security and Cultural 
Distinctions 
A second shortcoming in the cooperating states model is the 
reality that the prisons made available by the few cooperating 
states vary dramatically from inmate to inmate.91 The 
conditions, rehabilitation opportunities, and other penal issues 
                                               
87. Rep. of the Bureau on Cooperation, supra note 9, ¶ 22. 
88. See, e.g., Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 374 (“Despite the statutory preference for 
enforcement of SCSL sentences in Sierra Leone, the host state is not in a position to 
accept custody of SCSL prisoners[,]” but rather must “rely on third states for the 
implementation of its sentences.”); Hoffmann, supra note 21, at 841-42 (raising the 
question “whether it would not be preferable to establish a truly international prison 
with a set of international rules for imprisonment”). 
89. AMNESTY INT’L, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3 (2014), https://www. 
amnesty.org/download/Documents/8000/ior530102014en.pdf. 
90. Id. 
91. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 118-19 (illustrating that because “the 
law of the tribunals is virtually silent regarding the type of prisons international 
convicts shall be sent to,” the determination lies “with domestic authorities and arguably 
differs by state, but also by convict”). 
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are matters largely left to the discretion of individual states.92 
As Professors Holá and van Wijk observe: 
Whether an international prisoner is placed in a high 
security prison, protective custody, regular prison, or 
for example, an open prison, has a [sic] great 
consequences for his daily life and influences the 
execution of his/her sentence to a considerable extent. 
The law of the tribunals is virtually silent regarding the 
type of prisons international convicts shall be sent to.93 
The governing statutes merely mandate conformance with basic 
international standards.94 But, most germane issues are 
resolved locally and can vary quite dramatically from country to 
country and even prison to prison.95 
One would expect that the international community would 
strive to provide similar imprisonment conditions to those 
convicted of the same crime or even in the same conflict. 
However, the status quo depends fully on the cooperation of 
states that are free to receive only certain individuals and, 
thereafter, can place the individual in varying types of custody, 
which need only satisfy basic international norms. Such 
deviations are problematic and result in some inmates’ 
sentences carrying harsher conditions than others. Two ICTY 
convicts might receive the exact same sentence of fifteen years. 
But, depending on the prison conditions they face, their 
experiences may be markedly different.96 
                                               
92. See id. at 121-22, 125-26 (explaining that international prisoners are generally 
“incorporated into domestic prison populations[,]” where they are evaluated under the 
Presidents’ discretion and offered rehabilitation programs of the State). 
93. Id. at 119. 
94. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 106(1) (“The enforcement of a 
sentence of imprisonment shall be subject to the supervision of the Court and shall be 
consistent with widely accepted international treaty standards governing treatment of 
prisoners.”). 
95. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 118-22 (differentiating between 
European countries like Norway, where inmates are housed in smaller facilities, usually 
including an individual prison cell, and Italy or France, where inmates generally face 
issues related to overcrowding and are housed in shared prison cells). 
96. See id. at 120 (detailing that one ICTY convict in Finland has been allowed to 
serve his sentence in an “open prison,” described by the author as “a facility without any 
walls”). 
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One common feature of all international convicts, excepting 
the two ICC convicts, is that they have been designated to serve 
their sentences in locations far from the international convict’s 
home nation.97 The SCSL convicts housed in Rwanda are nearly 
3,000 miles from home.98 Even for the wealthiest individuals, 
opportunities to maintain relations with friends and family 
members imprisoned 3,000 miles away require a choice of 
relocation to an unfamiliar country or constant travel, which 
carries burdens of both time and expense.99 As previously 
mentioned, the cooperating states model has resulted in 
seventeen different European states willing to accept ICTY 
convicts (thirteen of which are actually housing prisoners) and 
two African states, Mali and Benin, willing to accept ICTR 
convicts (roughly 2,700 miles from Rwanda).100 In Europe, ICTY 
convicts are often integrated into the local prison population and 
serve side by side with individuals convicted of domestic 
crimes.101 SCSL convicts, in contrast, due largely to financial 
support from the Netherlands, have uniformly been placed in a 
special prison wing in Rwanda (a location nearly 3,000 miles 
                                               
97. See id. at 118 (stating that the “majority of ICTR prisoners” are designated to 
serve their sentences in Mali and Benin, and SCSL prisoners are designated to serve in 
Rwanda); see also Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 385-86 (noting the “very real risk that 
international sentences of imprisonment served in a decentralized system may be 
excessively isolating”). 
98. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 118 (explaining that although the SCSL 
entered into an enforcement agreement with four countries, all convicts except one are 
serving their sentences in Rwanda). 
99. See Jessica M. Kelder et al., Rehabilitation and Early Release of Perpetrators of 
International Crimes: A Case Study of the ICTY and ICTR, 14 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 1177, 
1190 (2014) (“As it is more difficult for families to visit, convicts complain that is it 
difficult to maintain close contact with relatives or partners.”). Special rules relating to 
visits have, however, been put in place for some international convicts, but, like all other 
instances of imprisonment, vary from country to country. See Holá & van Wijk, supra 
note 2, at 120 (explaining that “national authorities may provide special treatment for 
international prisoners,” such as Norway or France, which allow special arrangements 
for visiting hours “to allow the prisoners to spend as much time as possible with their 
family within the limited timeframe available”). 
100. Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 117-18. 
101. Id. at 120. 
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from Sierra Leone) and are kept separated from domestic 
inmates.102 
Unlike domestic prisons, which can also be a great distance 
from one’s village or town, the cooperating states model requires 
that family members traverse borders, not simply miles. And, 
for those imprisoned on the African continent, the distances 
between “home” and the prison facilities in Mali, Benin, and 
Rwanda are close to 3,000 miles away.103 For some international 
inmates and their families, separation covering such vast 
distances has endangered the continuation of meaningful family 
relations.104 
Another common feature under the status quo for 
individuals serving their sentences abroad is that the host 
countries often have different languages, cultures, and 
customs.105 In nearly every case, it is unlikely the international 
convict or his or her family will speak the language of the 
enforcing state, which can make communicating with guards, 
physicians, spiritual advisors, and prison staff problematic. 
Language shortcomings further limit an international convict’s 
ability to participate in rehabilitation programs, including 
educational opportunities or training programs.106 Such 
linguistic issues may even impair a family’s ability to familiarize 
                                               
102. Id. at 118; see also Distance from Rwanda to Sierra Leone, DISTANCEFROMTO, 
http://www.distancefromto.net/distance-from/Rwanda/to/Sierra+Leone (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2016) (calculating the distance between Sierra Leone and Rwanda at 2,957 
miles). The lone SCSL exception for sentencing purposes has been Charles Taylor. Holá 
& van Wijk, supra note 2, at 118. His unique situation is discussed in the text more fully 
below. 
103. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 118 (explaining that the ICTR sends the 
“vast majority” of Rwandan convicts to Mali and Benin to serve their sentences, and that 
the SCSL sends “[a]ll its [Sierra Leone] convicts” to Rwanda to serve their sentences). 
104. See, e.g., id. at 120 (detailing a prisoner in France who “was never visited by 
his family for four and a half years . . . due to practical obstacles such as costs of 
travelling and housing or visa requirements”). 
105. Id. at 118. 
106. See Mulgrew, supra note 28, 389 (observing that participation in prison 
programs “requires a high degree of competency in the national language of the 
enforcing state”); Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1190 (underscoring that “language 
barriers cause problems such as difficulties in understanding prison regulations, 
inability to participate in work or education programmes [and] problems in 
communicating with other prisoners, prison staff or the outside world”). 
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itself with the prison rules, thereby limiting or hampering 
visitation and communications.107 If educational classes are 
offered only in the enforcing state’s language, which most are, 
the international convict may find him or herself without access 
to otherwise available classes.108 The inability to communicate 
an inmate’s basic needs on a regular basis places that individual 
at a serious handicap during his or her incarceration.109 Further, 
unless the prison provides individualized rules and regulations 
tailored to the inmate’s native language, he or she may be 
unable to read governing policies or easily file a complaint or 
request services due to linguistic barriers in prison forms and 
policies. Even if a complaint is raised or a hearing held, unless 
the inmate is provided an interpreter, he or she may be at a 
severe disadvantage during the proceedings, particularly in 
relation to domestic prisoners. 
The contrast is stark between the World War II tribunals, 
which housed inmates in two prisons where inmates spoke a 
common language, and the modern cooperating states model.110 
At Nuremberg and Tokyo, convicts remained in their home 
countries, close to their families and with a familiar culture and 
language.111 The modern system jettisoned a local confinement 
                                               
107. See Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 390 (“Though the procedures for arranging 
visits in enforcing states are public, relatives may not speak the languages in which the 
literature is published.”); Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1190 (finding that “language 
barriers cause problems such as difficulties in understanding prison regulations,” which 
inhibit the communication between prison staff and family members wanting to visit or 
maintain close contact with convicts). 
108. See Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 389 (illustrating that prisoners without a 
“high degree of competency in the national language of the enforcing state” will be less 
likely to participate in the programs); Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1190 (explaining 
how “language barriers” effectively “negatively impact[] the prisoners’ abilities to 
integrate in prison or rehabilitate”). 
109. See Penrose, supra note 5, at 641 (“One of the more important requirements of 
any prison setting, at least from a human rights perspective, is that inmates retain the 
opportunity to convey their needs and concern to prison staff.”). 
110. Penrose, supra note 15, at 555 & 555 n.9. 
111. The International Military Tribunal was established in Nuremberg, Germany 
“to prosecute and punish” Nazi political and military leaders and the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East was created in Tokyo, Japan “to try and punish” 
Japanese political and military leaders. Milestones: 1945-1952: The Nuremberg Trial and 
the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1945-1948), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OFFICE OF THE 
HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nuremberg (last visited Mar. 
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approach, due, in part, to the fact that the tribunals were a 
United Nations’ creation, established in nation states other than 
where the conflict arose, and are not the product of a group of 
conquering allies. While the practice directions for the 
international tribunals regularly state the Registrar shall 
address the familial relations and linguistic skills of a particular 
convict and further mandates that the President “shall take into 
account the desirability of serving sentences in States within 
close proximity or accessibility of the relative of the convicted 
person,” these directions have proven to be of little benefit when 
only a handful of states have entered enforcement agreements 
with the tribunals.112 
Exporting those who have been convicted by an 
international tribunal has proven no easy task. Róisín Mulgrew 
and others have argued that the cooperating states model 
exacerbates the conditions of confinement by sending the 
convicted war criminals to distant locations where the lack of 
family, friends, a common language or culture, and even 
familiar cuisine are notably absent.113 There is an element of 
isolation to these incarcerations as many international convicts 
are placed in foreign prisons without programs or support 
systems tailored to their language, culture, or circumstances.114 
Even though international convicts often receive the benefit 
of higher living standards for their imprisonment, such 
protections come at the price of distance and isolation.115 These 
                                               
31, 2016); see also Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 391 (finding that familial relations are 
obviously far easier to maintain if an individual is incarcerated in his home State). 
112. MICT Practice Direction, Designation of State, supra note 74, ¶¶ 4(a), 4(e), 5; 
Rwanda Practice Direction, supra note 1, ¶¶ 3(i), 3(v), 4; Yugoslavia Practice Direction, 
supra note 1, ¶¶ 4(a), 4(e), 5; Sierra Leone Practice Direction, supra note 1, ¶¶ 4(i), 4(v), 
5. 
113. See, e.g., Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 385 (explaining SCSL prisoners receive 
less visits from family and may experience “socio-cultural isolation”); Kelder et al., supra 
note 99, at 1190 (explaining ICTY prisoners face cultural difficulties and receive fewer 
visits from relatives). 
114. See Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1190-91 (explaining the lack of 
rehabilitation programs tailored to international convicts). 
115. See id. at 1190 (“Serving a sentence in a foreign country typically has a 
negative impact on the ability of prisoners to reintegrate into society as they become 
socially isolated in prison.”). A good example of this distinction is the domestic Rwandan 
prisoners housed in the same facility with the SCSL convicts, but living in a separate 
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higher incarceration standards, which are based on key 
international human rights documents, though important, fall 
far short of equalizing the fact that the international convict is 
being housed in a location foreign to him in every conceivable 
sense of the word.116 For example, Charles Taylor, the only 
SCSL convict currently held outside of Africa, requested that he 
be imprisoned in Rwanda, where other international inmates 
are currently being held.117 After being sent to the United 
Kingdom and denied transfer to Rwanda, Taylor complained he 
was being denied “a right to family life” as his relatives were not 
granted visas.118 Taylor contended that a prison sentence in 
Rwanda would be safer for him and less expensive for his 
family.119 Finally, Taylor argued that his confinement to the 
hospital wing was “effectively in isolation” because he is “too 
much of a target and too vulnerable to be accommodated within 
the general prison population” of the Frankland prison in 
Durham, England where he is being held.120 Taylor’s final plea 
for an African placement was the need to be located in a prison 
where he shared “a cultural affinity” with others.121 The RSCSL 
denied his request.122 
                                               
wing with different standards of living and protection. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 
2, at 120 (noting that African prisons contain an international wing). International 
prisons must be kept in a location where international prison standards are honored. See 
id. at 118 (explaining that enforcement agreements require prisons to adhere to 
international standards). The same protection is not always afforded to domestic 
inmates. See id. at 120 (discussing the special international wing of the Rwandan 
prison). 
116. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 131 (describing the unique 
circumstances foreign prisoners encounter despite protections provided by international 
law). 
117. Liberia’s Charles Taylor Prefers Rwandan Jail to UK, BBC NEWS (Oct. 14, 
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24520489. 
118. Taylor filed a lengthy motion with the Residual Court for the SCSL on 
June 13, 2014. Motion for Termination of Enforcement of Sentence in the United 
Kingdom and for Transfer to Rwanda ¶ 3, In re Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. 
SCSL-03-01-ES (June 13, 2014).  
119. Id. ¶¶ 5, 37-38. 
120. Id. ¶ 4. 
121. Id. ¶ 55. 
122. In re Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-ES, Decision on Charles 
Ghankay Taylor’s Motion for Termination of Enforcement of Sentence in the United 
Kingdom and for Transfer to Rwanda, ¶ 38 (May 21, 2015). 
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Taylor’s situation provides a concrete example of the 
cultural dimension and shortcomings relating to sentencing 
enforcement. The incident regarding Radislav Krstic, an ICTY 
convict, provides a similar example of the security shortcomings 
in the status quo.123 
C. Security 
Beyond limited access to family, friends, familiar foods, 
culture, and religious practices, there is evidence that security 
risks for these international convicts are higher when comingled 
with domestic inmates.124 Radislav Krstić, an ICTY convict of 
Serbian heritage, suffered severe injuries after being repeatedly 
stabbed by three British Muslim inmates seeking revenge for 
Krstić’s crimes against Muslims.125 This episode, occurring 
within the Wakefield prison in Britain, underscores the security 
risk of placing international convicts within a domestic prison 
without physically isolating them.126 And, as these inmates are 
already culturally and relationally isolated, placing 
international inmates in physical isolation further accentuates 
the inherent flaws in a cooperating states model. Following the 
Wakefield stabbing, Krstić was transferred back to the United 
Nations Detention Unit in the Hague to await reassignment to 
another cooperating state.127 Krstić remained at the Hague 
Detention Unit for nearly two years before Poland agreed, in 
                                               
123. See Martin Wainwright, Srebrenica General’s Attackers Get Life for Revenge 
Stabbing in Prison, GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2011, 12:09 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/ 2011/feb/21/srebrenica-general-revenge-prison-attack 
(explaining that Krstić was attacked and had sustained severe injuries in a high security 
British prison). 
124. See Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 376-77 (explaining security risks concerning 
international prisoners). 
125. Wainwright, supra note 123. 
126. See Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 385 (explaining that the nationality of and 
length of sentences for international convicts may result in a high security classification 
because enforcing states want to prevent such prisoners from being harmed). 
127. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. MICT-13-46-ES/IT-98-33-ES, Order 
Designating the State in Which Radislav Krstić Is to Serve the Remainder of His 
Sentence (July 19, 2013), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/presord/en/130719.pdf. 
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May 2013, to receive Krstić pursuant a December 6, 2012 Polish 
court order.128 
The potential security issues only compound the limitations 
of the cooperating state model. Not only may inmates fear being 
sent to a distant and unfamiliar location, there is the added fear, 
at least for some, that other inmates within the host state will 
learn of their crimes and seek to inflict injurious retribution. 
Krstić experienced this fear and sustained injuries while housed 
in Britain. Charles Taylor voiced this fear, though the SCSL 
discounted his pleas, keeping him imprisoned in Britain.129 
Interestingly, the 3,000 mile distance between England and 
Sierra Leone is equivalent to the distance separating Taylor’s 
desired placement in Rwanda from Sierra Leone. But, as 
Taylor’s request indicates, it is not merely distance that 
exacerbates a sentence, but also family relations and security 
concerns. When assessing the best host country for a particular 
inmate, as we have seen with Krstić, issues relating to the 
international convict’s security should be an integral part of the 
sentencing decision. 
D. Rehabilitation, Release, and Reintegration 
A fourth shortcoming with the status quo is the uncertainty 
regarding early release and the absence of appropriate 
rehabilitation and reintegration programs in enforcing states.130 
Because the current model relies on cooperating states and 
                                               
128. See id. (explaining that Poland agreed to received Krstić). Poland entered into 
an Enforcement Agreement with the ICTY on September 18, 2008. Agreement Between 
the Government of the Republic of Poland and the United Nations on the Enforcement of 
Sentences of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Pol.-U.N., 
Sept. 18, 2008, 2605 U.N.T.S. 177. 
129. Motion for Termination of Enforcement of Sentence in the United Kingdom 
and for Transfer to Rwanda ¶ 4, In re Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-ES 
(June 13, 2014). In re Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-ES, Decision on 
Charles Ghankay Taylor’s Motion for Termination of Enforcement of Sentence in the 
United Kingdom and for Transfer to Rwanda, ¶ 38 (May 21, 2015). (explaining that a 
special Trial Chamber appointed by RSCSL President Justice Philip N. Waki denied 
Taylor’s motion in January 2015). 
130. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 125 (explaining that there is a lack of 
clear assessment criteria regarding the early release of international prisoners); see also 
Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1202 (explaining how early release and rehabilitation 
programs could be improved). 
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utilizes local law, in combination with tribunal consultation, for 
determining early release, international convicts with identical 
sentences may be subject to differing rules regarding early 
release.131 Mulgrew notes the shortcoming with this approach: 
“A system that places the trigger for release eligibility with 
enforcing states lacks certainty and creates the potential for 
discrimination due to the variation between the different 
domestic laws.”132 
In contrast to early release, the issue of rehabilitation, 
apparently relevant to the ad hoc tribunals in sentencing, has 
largely been overlooked in international enforcement.133 Under 
the status quo, international tribunals delegate rehabilitation 
assessments, both testing and reporting, to domestic prisons 
that have little experience working with those convicted of 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.134 As Kelder, 
Holá, and van Wijk explain, 
The fact that the tribunals are not actively involved in 
the enforcement of sentences means that the [tribunal] 
President relies heavily on information provided by 
third parties . . . . Although enforcement states have not 
been given any guidance on how to rehabilitate 
international prisoners, the President typically trusts 
their reports about a convicts’ behaviour in prison and 
follows their advice in relation to the prisoner’s level of 
rehabilitation.135 
To delegate imprisonment of war criminals to enforcing states 
whose penal policies target more ordinary criminals seems 
                                               
131. See S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 19, art. 26 (explaining that each State uses its 
own rules when deciding whether to pardon a prisoner and then notifies the MICT 
accordingly). 
132. MULGREW, supra note 15, at 57. 
133. See Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1179 (contending that rehabilitation has 
been “entirely neglected by academia and practitioners alike”). 
134. See id. at 1193-94 (observing that the tribunal “President seems to do little to 
critically asses the underlying sources submitted [by enforcing states] to demonstrate 
prisoners’ rehabilitation”). 
135. Id. 
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incongruent with the desire to treat international convicts 
similarly.136 Inconsistencies in treatment will inevitably occur. 
Mulgrew further observes that “the enforcing state is under 
no obligation to make connections with post-release services in 
third states,” thus limiting opportunities international convicts 
have for reintegration.137 And, the basis for release hinges, at 
least partially, on the cooperating state’s domestic structure for 
early release.138 If rehabilitation entails reintegration into 
society, an international prison with personnel targeting the 
particular crimes covered – genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity – will far better address the unique nature of 
such crimes and the motivations that lead otherwise ordinary 
individuals to commit such extraordinary acts.139 Kelder, Holá, 
and van Wijk assert that 
International crimes . . . are not committed by 
abnormal (deviant) and extraordinary people, but are 
instead first and foremost characterized by the fact that 
perpetrators commit crimes in abnormal and 
extraordinary circumstances. [Thus,] conventional 
rehabilitation programmes developed for deviant 
individuals aimed to reintegrate them back into society 
and to facilitate a crime-free life are not appropriate for 
international prisoners.140 
Without a permanent prison and a system coordinating 
parole or probation, international convicts are, in the most real 
sense, merely warehoused in domestic prisons.141 International 
inmates serve their time and, once they are either scheduled for 
release or released they are given little to no reintegration 
                                               
136. See id. at 1196-97 (claiming that international criminals, because of the 
large-scale crimes they commit, are fundamentally different than ordinary criminals). 
137. Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 390. 
138. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 113 (explaining that the imprisonment 
of an international prisoner is governed by the law of the enforcement state). 
139. See Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1196-97 (discussing how persons who 
commit international crimes tend to come from deviant societal contexts). 
140. Id. at 1197. 
141. See, e.g., Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 390 (explaining that international 
convicts cannot “avail themselves of opportunities designed to enable prisoners ‘to look 
for work, to make contacts with social services and to prepare for freedom’”). 
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efforts dedicated to their successful return into society.142 There 
is generally no continued oversight or custodial supervision.143 
Early release, in the current international context, typically 
means absolute freedom. The notable exception appears to be 
the RSCSL’s approach granting conditional release.144 However, 
in some instances, early release means an inability to return 
home or elsewhere.145 The individual may no longer be behind 
bars, but neither is he or she necessarily free to return to their 
pre-incarceration life.146 
Under most domestic prison systems, inmates scheduled for 
release go through a process to prepare them to re-enter society, 
which may include graded reductions in security and increased 
opportunities for self-sufficiency.147 Most domestic prison 
systems maintain a programmatic approach to early release, be 
it probation or some other form of reintegration that retains 
some level of continuing oversight of the prisoner.148 But, under 
the current system of cooperating states model where 
international convicts are sent to distant locations to serve their 
sentences, such domestic programs are generally not available 
to international inmates set to leave the enforcing state upon 
release.149 As Kelder, Holá, and van Wijk observe, “[i]n contrast 
to the domestic jurisdictions, the practice of setting conditions 
                                               
142. See id. (noting that under the current system, “it seems unlikely that 
enforcing institutions will be able to provide meaningful support to international 
prisoners preparing for return to society”). 
143. Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 129. 
144. SCSL Practice Direction, Early Release, supra note 74, pmb. 
145. Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 129-30 (reporting on the varied outcomes 
international prisoners face upon release, including at least one example where an 
international prisoner, Erdemovic, was placed in a witness protection program and given 
a new identity and several others where ICTR convicts were placed in a “safe house” in 
Tanzania upon their release). 
146. See id. (providing numerous examples of life after incarceration). 
147. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, HANDBOOK ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSFER OF SENTENCED PERSONS 9, 11 (2012) (emphasizing the attention paid to 
rehabilitation and noting the availability of self-sufficiency aimed practices, such as 
“prison leave and other authorized forms of exits from prison,” that are available in 
domestic prison systems). 
148. Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 129. 
149. See id. (describing life after release for international convicts as a time when 
the “prisoners are literally ‘off the radar’”). 
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upon early release – e.g., no repetition of offenses – does not 
exist for ICTY and ICTR convicts.”150 
Although early release for international convicts is 
evaluated by assessing domestic law, and relies largely on local 
assessment regarding rehabilitation, that same domestic law 
does not provide programmatic support or continuing oversight 
for the international convict.151 Lacking any monitoring system 
for released international convicts, excepting the RSCSL 
conditional release program, “the prisoners disappear from the 
tribunals’ radar and are not of their concern.”152 Kelder, Holá, 
and van Wijk provide troubling case examples where failure to 
monitor those released by international tribunals have 
seemingly undermined the values of international criminal 
justice, with the perpetrators largely flaunting their freedom 
and retracting any claims of remorse.153 
To ensure that sentences are being uniformly served under 
similar conditions and that rehabilitation and reintegration are 
made part of the sentencing enforcement process, a permanent 
prison with attendant personnel, parole officers, and consistent 
rules relating to rehabilitation and early release is needed. If all 
international convicts are being sentenced for similar crimes, or 
at least crimes of a similar magnitude, there should be 
standardized governing principles put in to operation based on 
the underlying crime, independent from the nation state 
receiving the inmate for sentencing enforcement purposes. The 
current ad hoc approach to imprisonment leads to unacceptably 
inconsistent approaches toward rehabilitation and early 
release.154 
                                               
150. Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1198. 
151. Id. at 1193-94. 
152. Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1198 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
153. See id. at 1199-1200 (detailing the post-release behavior of ICTY convicts 
Biljana Plavsic and Veselin Sljivancanin). 
154. See MULGREW, supra note 15, at 57 (“A system that places the trigger for 
release eligibility with enforcing states lacks certainty and creates the potential for 
discrimination due to the variation between the different domestic laws.”). 
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Reintegration, both through graded release and continuing 
oversight, is a vital component of penal policy.155 The current 
model omits critical rehabilitation and reintegration structures 
and, thus, provides additional support for concentrating the 
sentencing enforcement process in an international prison 
system. 
IV. OBSTACLES TO CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL PRISON 
The creation of an international prison system, much like 
the creation of an international court system, presents both 
costs and risks. The ICC follows several ad hoc international 
tribunals and holds the promise of a lasting solution to 
addressing international crimes. These initial court efforts at 
the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, and ICC have all incurred extensive 
financial costs and burdens.156 And, because the work of the 
tribunals created long prison sentences that have outlasted the 
ad hoc tribunals, there are the additional costs related to the 
MICT and the RSCSL.157 Thus, the ad hoc tribunals may have 
ceased operations, but the sentences and cases still remaining 
have required the creation of secondary or residual courts to 
slowly winnow away at the remaining work still to be done. The 
RSCSL projects that it may need to remain in operation until 
2055 to finalize all its work relating to the enforcement of 
sentences.158 
                                               
155. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 147, pt. III. A. (noting that 
the “essential aim of a penitentiary system is the reformation and social rehabilitation of 
prisoners”). 
156. See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 10 (raising the question whether the “I.C.C. is 
simply too expensive and ineffective to justify”); Gabriël Oosthuizen & Robert Schaeffer, 
Complete Justice: Residual Functions and Potential Residual Mechanisms of the ICTY, 
ICTR and SCSL, 3 HAGUE JUST. J. 48, 59 (2008) (“The costs associated with the ICTY, 
ICTR and SCSL are high . . . .”). 
157. See S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 19, art. 1 (noting the additional costs 
associated with implementing the MICT); Agreement to Establish RSCSL, supra note 
66, art. 3 (granting the Parties and the oversight committee the option to “explore 
alternative means of financing”). 
158. See The Mandate of the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone: Background, 
supra note 66 (noting that as part of its ad hoc functions, the RSCSL “will have the 
authority to manage requests for review from convicted persons and this function may 
extend until 2055”). 
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Judges, courtrooms, and court staff are expenses that must 
be borne if an international court system is to function 
effectively. Time has provided great experience, including a 
demonstration of modest cooperation from nation states. From a 
post-World War II version of “victor’s justice” to the modern ICC, 
which covers nearly the entire world, international courts have 
evolved slowly but deliberately. Perhaps then, as the world 
community considers the financial cost of erecting and 
maintaining a permanent international criminal court,159 
thought should be given to erecting and maintaining a true, 
permanent prison facility for international convicts. 
The first obstacle will be location. Great consideration 
should be given to those countries and locations where 
construction might not be required from the ground up. Rather, 
a location          – one that is centrally located in a politically 
stable country with a solid record regarding human rights – 
should be selected to refine an existing structure capable of 
providing the highest level of service and security to 
international convicts. But, a complicating factor in the analysis 
for creating a single prison location is that our world is so 
enormous and diverse. What one country could house such 
distinctive populations supporting numerous languages, 
cultures, and religions? These are troubling questions that have 
not yet been adequately analyzed or discussed by scholars, 
lawyers, and judges. 
A. The Costs 
Much like the actual costs borne by the ICTY, ICTY, SCSL, 
and ICC, there will be actual costs borne by an international 
prison system, one involving building maintenance, staffing, and 
programmatic expenditures. If the convicts at the former ad hoc 
international tribunals or the ICC are to be held in a single 
location or in regional facilities overseen by a single supervising 
entity, a physical prison structure must either be built or 
remodeled. These costs involve real money, including bricks and 
                                               
159. See ICC Holds Groundbreaking Ceremony for Permanent Premises 
Construction, supra note 14 (explaining the funding for the permanent ICC in the 
Netherlands). 
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mortar. In addition, there will be staffing needs, from wardens, 
to guards, to medical and religious personnel. Building and 
maintaining a prison is a costly endeavor. Some country, entity, 
international organization, or combination thereof will need to 
absorb the costs associated with both constructing and running 
an international prison. 
There are costs of outfitting the inmates, creating and 
printing prison rules, providing guards and prison staff capable 
of communicating with the inmates, medical personnel and 
facilities, access to psychological and psychiatric services, 
educational and career training, access to religious and spiritual 
advisors, and food services capable of feeding a variety of dietary 
needs, and security. 
And, much like the evolution from Spandau Prison in 
Germany, where the Allies oversaw their convicts in a 
conquered country,160 to a system where cooperating states host 
international convicts, the trajectory suggests a need for 
consolidation – either to a single international prison unit or, 
perhaps, regional units existing under a single international 
prison umbrella. As set forth above, there are many notable 
shortcomings in the cooperating states model, from the obvious 
and consistent lack of cooperation to issues stemming from early 
release and lack of rehabilitation programs. Additionally, the 
distance, linguistic, and security concerns are already noted as 
issues under the status quo. 
B. Safety and Security Issues 
In addition to real financial costs, there are safety risks 
involved with creating an international prison. First, the risk of 
placing all high level international criminals in a single location, 
potentially with regional facilities, could increase security 
concerns for individuals displeased with tribunal outcomes or 
international justice. Because the ICC will be handling only 
those individuals whose crimes merit international attention, it 
                                               
160. See Wolfgang Saxon, Spandau Prison: Hess’s Lonely Dungeon, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 18 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/18/nyregion/spandau-prison-hess-s-
lonely-dungeon.html (noting that Spandau was “the last vestige of postwar four-power 
rule in Germany” whereby guards from Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the 
United States oversaw the prison). 
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can be expected that the crimes will stem, like those heard 
before the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, from internal conflicts and 
wars with continuing unrest in the home country. Such grouped 
incarceration might embolden members of one of the warring 
factions, or others, to target an international prison or 
international prison employees. What country or countries 
would be willing to assume the risk of housing the worst of the 
worst, collectively, and withstand the constant security threat 
such inmates pose? Is the concentration of the world’s most 
notorious international criminals in a single location a truly 
workable solution? While this concentration has already 
occurred uneventfully, at least from a security perspective, in 
the Hague and Tanzania, these distant locations provided some 
measure of security for those angry in Yugoslavia, Rwanda or, 
most recently, the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
On the other hand, the question of security might also be 
more easily answered in a single location where adequate 
exterior and interior security may actually provide greater 
protection to those convicted of the worst crimes known to 
humanity. If a single location could be selected, the 
concentration of individuals all posing a high security risk could 
be collectively addressed to minimize security breaches. Further, 
the location itself could provide heightened security protections 
against outside threats. From island selections to remote areas 
within numerous nation states, the issue of security poses both a 
risk and potential advantage in terms of housing war criminals 
and international convicts. 
The security question naturally raises, and is tied to, the 
related issue of location. How does the international community 
address the risk in deciding where such international prison, or 
regional prisons, might be built and maintained? Will there 
continue to be European and African overrepresentation? The 
variation of prison facilities between poorer countries and 
wealthier, industrialized countries is relevant from a human 
rights perspective. But, giving emphasis to wealthier countries 
could compromise certain individuals’ access to family, legal 
counsel, religious traditions, cultural institutions and dietary 
requirements by placing a prison outside the realm of travel for 
many families. While an international prison may not resolve 
these “location” issues, at least all international convicts will be 
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similarly disadvantaged and their families on notice of where 
they must travel. And, if a single location is ultimately selected, 
families confronting visa requests and housing needs will face 
similar procedures for securing visits. 
While location becomes relevant to ensuring safety, any 
selected location cannot be so remote that family, friends and 
others, like legal counsel, are prevented from visiting and 
maintaining relations with the inmate. If a new, truly 
international prison is to be constructed, efforts must be made to 
protect against recreating the flaws existing in the current 
system – such as isolation from friends and family. The most 
centralized location, with adequate transport options (bus, rail 
and air) should be sought. Regardless of location, there must be 
efforts made to make an international prison truly transnational 
and capable of hosting a range of nationalities, languages, 
religious traditions and dietary needs. 
Security is a major issue, presenting both potential risks 
and rewards, but other demands – particularly those exposed 
under the status quo – will quickly require attention. 
C. Creating Uniformity Among Diversity 
The goal of an international prison must be to provide a 
standardized global response to a universal problem. An 
international prison will, eventually, have inmates from across 
the world, bringing together a cacophony of languages and 
cultures. The creators of an international prison will have to 
work diligently to ensure that no matter who is incarcerated, 
acceptable meals, rules and religious options are available to all. 
There can be no superior cultural norm – no Westernization or 
Easternization of treatment. There must be cultural sensitivity 
and, yet, common norms. This delicate balance may actually be 
the most daunting task facing the creation and maintenance of 
an international prison. 
In some countries, chain gang or work requirements exist. 
In others, the focus of incarceration may be rehabilitation or 
reintegration into society as a law-abiding, even educated, 
citizen. But what is the penal goal of international justice? Will 
inmates receive funds to purchase items at a commissary? Will 
inmates be expected to work in jobs at the prison, as barbers, 
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cooks and lawn care personnel? What standards of care, beyond 
the United Nations minimum standards, will govern? And, 
equally important, who will choose which norms govern? This 
author would delegate entirely the task of assessing both penal 
policies and creation of an international prison to one entity, 
preferably one similar to that presented below. 
The answers to these questions are still evolving. There 
appears to be a deep incongruity between the lengthy sentences 
issued by international tribunals with sentences served in 
unfamiliar countries and the goal of rehabilitative urged by 
human rights documents. This article does not allow for a more 
thorough consideration of the ultimate penal policies an 
international prison should adopt, but does note that 
centralizing international convicts in a single prison will 
undoubtedly lead to more fair and consistent treatment with a 
more uniform approach to penal policy and does argue for 
creation of a new entity to oversee the process. 
To ensure uniform treatment for all international convicts 
and in a move toward creating a permanent international 
prison, I recommend the creation of an International Prison 
Advisory Panel (IPAP) staffed with prison experts from a fair 
cross section of the globe. The IPAP should be integrated into 
the current ICC and MICT bodies, thereby informing the current 
structure where enforcement state designations and early 
release decisions are made by the ICC President or appropriate 
RSCSL Chamber. The IPAP should address all inmate issues 
arising from current internationally focused courts and residual 
mechanisms, such as the ICC, the MICT, and RSCSL. The IPAP 
should prioritize the creation and maintenance of an 
international prison system as its focus. The IPAP’s initial 
charter should establish goals for creating a permanent prison, 
creating standardized penal policies for international convicts 
and for staffing both a prison, inclusive of diverse rehabilitation 
programs, and a standardized early release program for each 
respective court (i.e. one standardized program for the ICC and 
another for the RSCSL). 
The IPAP should be funded by a reliable source, either the 
United Nations or the ICC. If funded by the United Nations, the 
IPAP could also be governed by the United Nations and located 
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at the New York Headquarters or, in the alternative, wherever 
the permanent prison location is. If the ICC becomes the source 
of funding, the IPAP can be housed at the Hague or, again, 
wherever the ultimate site of the permanent prison is. The IPAP 
should be given input in the enforcement of international 
sentences flowing from the ICC or any ad hoc tribunals as the 
international community weans itself from the cooperating 
states model and reliance on state input. While the current legal 
structure does not permit complete delegation, this author 
believes the legal framework should be amended to provide 
IPAP with some role in sentence enforcement, including input 
regarding early and conditional release. 
IPAP is simply a concept, much like the Rome Statute was 
two decades ago. To bring this idea to fruition would 
undoubtedly require both reassessment and amendment to 
governing documents binding the international tribunals. But, 
to be effective, this idea requires complete incorporation into the 
status quo, not merely a subsidiary existence adding to the 
deficiencies of the status quo. 
In terms of IPAP composition, there should be at least one 
representative from Africa, Asia, Europe, the Americas, the 
Middle East and Russia or the Slavic countries. It would be 
advisable to include those who have had experience dealing with 
the housing of international convicts from the ICTY, the ICTR 
and the SCSL. Countries refusing ICC membership or 
jurisdictional application before the ICC should not be permitted 
on the panel. Instead, countries whose citizens might be 
vulnerable to international prosecution before the ICC and other 
ad hoc tribunals should have both a voice and potentially 
representation on the IPAP. The purpose of the IPAP will be to 
ensure consistent treatment among internationally sentenced 
individuals. At present, that task of ensuring fair and humane 
treatment is shared by numerous entities and borne, largely, by 
the host nation states themselves. Because sentencing 
enforcement is an integral part of the criminal prosecution 
process, including issues relating to early and conditional 
release, the IPAP should be included in the process to ensure 
that sentence enforcements become more uniform, predictive 
and fair. 
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The IPAP should have a minimum of seven and a maximum 
of nine individual members, with a goal of securing race, gender 
and religious diversity. Terms should be strictly limited to no 
more than three years so that no one individual or country has a 
hold on the ideas being discussed or programs pursued in a 
permanent prison facility for the international community. The 
terms among the panel should be staggered so that there is 
some level of continuity among the panel. For example, if the 
panel has nine members, each year there should be three 
positions that become vacant for three new members. An IPAP 
would ensure a continuing commitment to prison oversight and 
improvements as international law evolves. 
The advantages of creating an IPAP is that this group could 
be responsible for all facets of creating, and ultimately, 
overseeing an international prison, from budgeting to prison 
inspections to determining policies and procedures for 
international convicts. Further, because past sentences issued 
by the ICTY and ICTR were not always consistent, IPAP should 
provide some guidance in the sentencing enforcement process – 
from state designation to early release, even if this guidance is 
only placed in IPAP Advisories. The IPAP could further work 
with the ICC, the MICT and the RSCSL to ensure that the 
international community is developing an actual penal policy for 
those found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
not simply perpetuating the ad hoc approach to the enforcement 
of sentences. IPAP’s greatest contribution to international 
criminal law, in fact, could be creating the first truly 
international penal policy governing international crimes. This 
article does not tackle the far more difficult question of what the 
international penal policy should be, involving choices between 
deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation, among others, and 
would think it advisable to delegate such Herculean task to the 
IPAP. At present, the focus appears to be on imprisonment for a 
term rather than imprisonment for a purpose.161 Creating and 
utilizing an IPAP could help properly place imprisonment in the 
larger context of an international criminal system, as opposed to 
                                               
161. See generally Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 111-12, 125 (noting the 
general lack of uniformity of importance placed on the rehabilitation of international 
criminals, and the generally long sentence terms they serve). 
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merely warehousing convicted individuals, thereby improving on 
the current free-floating, ad hoc system. 
V. CONCLUSION: THE BENEFITS OF AN INTERNATIONAL 
PRISON OUTWEIGH THE RISKS 
One must ask why little progress has been made regarding 
the creation of an international prison. Is the issue safety, 
finances, building location(s) or simply lassitude? Has any 
government, committee or non-governmental organization 
undertaken a proper study balancing the benefits versus risks of 
creating an international prison? We have a clear need to 
address the issue of punishment and imprisonment now that we 
have a permanent court.162 And, the question of where these 
international convicts will be housed moving forward is no 
longer merely a theoretical problem. The time for creating an 
international prison is upon us. We must act now.163 Creating an 
IPAP provides one vision of a potential solution. 
The time has come for a permanent prison solution. We have 
an international criminal court. We need an international 
prison. Deterrence will be furthered if the cooperation among 
nations is both united and permanent. The ICC should be the 
starting point for a larger, more permanent approach to 
realizing the still unachieved promise of “never again.” The 
world deserves an international criminal court that is capable of 
enforcing its judgments without relying on willing or 
cooperating states. Prison, for a court whose sentencing options 
are primarily focused on incarceration, should have been a 
starting point, not an afterthought. The time is ripe for an 
international prison if, in fact, we are committed to 
international justice, not merely prosecutions. 
                                               
162. See Penrose, supra note 5, at 642 (noting that a permanent criminal court will 
require a permanent prison facility for placement of its condemned, who would best be 
served by the “utilization of regional facilities”). 
163. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 122 (noting that forty-five percent of all 
international convicts have been released); ICC Res. RC/Res.3, supra note 50, ¶¶ 1-2 
(noting that the Resolution, while again calling on States to “indicate to the Court their 
willingness to accept sentenced persons[,]” also confirms that “a sentence of 
imprisonment may be served in a prison facility made available in the designated State 
through an international or regional organization, mechanism or agency”). 
